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1. Note that the sharp dete-
rioration of Icelandic net
international investment
position after the crisis
(Table 2) is largely related
to defaulted banks.
Benediktsdottir, Danielsson
and Gylfi Zoega (2011)
conclude that without
banks, the international
investment position of Ice-
land has improved. Table 3
shows that three-quarters
of gross external debt is the
liability of defaulted banks.
According to Lane (2011b),
the significant deterioration
of Irish net external liabili-
ties during the past three
years is most likely related
to the internationally-lever-
aged structure of the finan-
cial portfolios of domestic
Irish residents.
1 INTRODUCTION
Three small, open European economies —Iceland,
Ireland and Latvia with populations of 0.3, 4.4 and
2.3 million respectively—got into serious trouble
during the global financial crisis. Behind their
problems were rapid credit growth and expansion
of other banking activities in the years leading up
to the crisis (Table 1), largely financed by
international borrowing. This led to sharp
increases in gross (Iceland and Ireland) and net
(Iceland and Latvia) foreign liabilities (Tables 2
and 3)1. Credit booms fuelled property-price
booms and a rapid increase in the contribution of
the construction sector to output – above 10
percent in all three countries. While savings-
investment imbalances in the years of high
growth were largely of private origin, public
spending kept up with the revenue over-
performance that was the consequence of
buoyant economic activity. During the crisis,
property prices collapsed, construction activity
contracted and public revenues fell, especially
those related to the previously booming sectors.
All three countries had to turn to the International
Monetary Fund and their European partners for
help.
There were also common elements to crisis
management in the three countries. Fiscal
austerity programmes, structural reforms, the
fostering of private debt restructuring and
strengthening of the banking system were central
to their economic adjustment programmes. 
However, partly due to differences in institutional
set up, there were marked differences in policy
responses, in terms of, for example, exchange rate
policy, the adoption of capital controls and the
handling of the banking crisis. There were also
marked differences in economic outcomes. 
The purpose of this Policy Contribution is to
compare the policy responses in, and the
adjustments made by, the three countries. Based
on this comparison, we draw lessons for exchange
rate policy, internal devaluation, capital controls,
banking sector restructuring and fiscal
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Table 1: Assets of the banking system (% GDP)
2000 2004 2007 2010
Credit to the private sector
Iceland 97 165 349 n.a.
Ireland 105 134 200 213
Latvia 19 51 89 104
Total assets
Iceland (with inter-inst. transactions)* 385 542 1035 n.a.
Iceland (w/out inter-inst. transactions)* 236 285 426 n.a.
Ireland (total) n.a. 484 706 759
Ireland (excluding international banks) n.a. 230 367 476
Latvia n.a. 106 145 169
Source: Bruegel; credit to the private sector is from the IMF IFS; total assets are from Central Bank of Iceland, Central Bank of
Ireland and Central Bank of Latvia. Note: Ireland’s figures for total assets include the Irish operations of international banks.
* The Central Bank of Iceland reports assets both with and without inter-institutional transactions. Total liabilities reported
are equal to total assets without inter-institutional transactions. The increase in the credit/GDP ratio from 2007 to 2010 in Ire-
land and Latvia is primarily due to the fall in GDP.
consolidation. By selecting similar countries that
responded differently, this paper conducts a kind
of controlled experiment, even though we cannot
always isolate the impacts of individual elements
of the policy mix.
The next section discusses the key differences in
policy responses, followed by an assessment of
economic outcomes. The final section concludes
and compares the results with other perspectives
expressed in the literature.
2 DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL SET UP AND
POLICY RESPONSE
2.1 Exchange rate regime and developments
There was a broad consensus at the outbreak of
the crisis that real exchange rates in all three
countries should be depreciated to help economic
recovery – which has indeed happened during the
past three years, but through different means and
to different degrees.  
The differences are partly related to exchange rate
regimes and partly to policy choices. Ireland has
been a member of the euro area since 1999, and
therefore adjustment through the nominal
exchange rate against the euro was not an option.
Latvia has had a fixed exchange rate with the euro
since 2004, and Latvian policymakers chose not
to exercise the option to devalue2. Both Ireland
and Latvia decided to embark on a so called
‘internal devaluation’, ie efforts to cut wages and
prices. Iceland has a floating exchange rate. When
markets started to panic and withdrew external
lending, given the size of the country’s obligations
(Table 2), there was no choice but to let the
2. Even though Ireland has
the euro and the Latvian lat
is fixed to the euro, the
nominal effective exchange
rates of these two countries
do change somewhat when
the exchange rate of the
euro against other curren-
cies changes, because
some of the trade of these
countries goes outside the
euro area. But these
changes are largely exoge-
nous, because asymmetric
shocks in Ireland and Latvia
have limited, if any, impact
on the euro’s exchange
rates. Note that Latvia had a
peg against the SDR (IMF
Special Drawing Rights)
until 2004 and in this
period the nominal effective
exchange rate was more
variable, as indicated by
Figure 1.
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currency depreciate. The Icelandic krona
depreciated by about 50 percent in nominal terms
– depreciation would have been sharper without
capital controls (see section 2.3 below).
Nevertheless the unit labour-cost (ULC) based real
effective exchange rate (REER) has depreciated
in all three countries. The ULC-REER can be
decomposed as:
where reer(ulc) is the labour-cost based real
Zsolt Darvas  A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES
Table 2: International investment position (% GDP)
2000 2004 2007 2010
Iceland
Foreign assets 45 125 514 266
Foreign liabilities 112 192 625 895
Net foreign assets -67 -66 -112 -629
Ireland
Foreign assets 643 857 1195 1691
Foreign liabilities 650 875 1215 1782
Net foreign assets -8 -18 -19 -91
Latvia
Foreign assets 50 65 81 117
Foreign liabilities 80 118 155 197
Net foreign assets -30 -52 -75 -80
Table 3: Gross external debt of Iceland (% GDP)
2000Q4 2004Q4 2007Q4 2008Q3 2008Q4 2011Q2
Monetary authorities 2 0 0 6 20 18
General government 24 23 19 42 36 33
Deposit money banks (DMBs) 51 131 455 685 46 11
Other sectors 27 19 46 61 806 751
DMBs undergoing winding-up proceedings ... ... ... ... 739 696
Others 27 19 46 61 67 55
Direct investment 1 6 48 72 90 93
Total external debt 107 179 568 866 998 906
Source: Bruegel based on Central Bank of Iceland (external debt) and Eurostat (GDP at current prices).
Source: Bruegel based on central banks of the three countries
(foreign assets and liabilities) and Eurostat (GDP at current
prices). Note: see Table 3 and Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and
Gylfi Zoega (2011) for the interpretation of Icelandic net for-
eign assets position change during the past three years, and
Lane (2011b) for an assessment of the Irish case.
=  ,
neer · ulcreer(ulc) ===
ulc(foreign)
neer · empl · hours · wage
production
ulc(foreign)
( (
neer · wage neer · wage
ulc(foreign) ·
production
empl · hours(
( ulc(foreign) · productivity
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3. Most likely in all three
countries there was a
change in skill composition
of employed labour during
the crisis: probably more
unskilled jobs were lost
than skilled jobs. If this is
the case, the average wage
tends to increase due to
this compositional change.
4. From 2009Q2 to
2011Q2, average hourly
labour costs fell by 5.1 per-
cent in the public sector
and 3.1 percent in the pri-
vate sector. Additionally, in
the public sector, a 7.5 per-
cent pension levy was
imposed in 2010.
effective exchange rate, neer is the nominal
effective exchange rate (an increase indicates
appreciation), ulc is the domestic unit labour
cost, ulc(foreign) is the foreign unit labour cost, empl
is the number of people employed, hours is the
average hours worked per employee, wage is the
nominal hourly wage (or more precisely: hourly
labour cost, which is also effected by, eg changes
in social security contributions paid by the
employer), production is real output (GDP), and
productivity is production divided by labour
input, which is the product of number of people
employed and their average hours worked. 
Table 4 presents this decomposition for the
changes in the real exchange rate from the real
exchange rate peak to 2011Q3. It should be noted
that the adjustment might continue in the future
and therefore the table reports the developments
during the past three years. For example, as Figure
1 indicates, ULC-based REER is still clearly moving
downwards in Ireland, is moving somewhat
upwards in Iceland, and has flattened out in Latvia. 
In Iceland the main driving force of real
depreciation was the significant fall in the nominal
exchange rate (45 percent in the period shown in
Table 4). Productivity and trading partners’ ULC
have hardly changed. While the depreciation-
induced wage inflation3 (24 percent) eroded
some of gain from the fall of the nominal exchange
rate, the krona is still weaker by 31 percent
relative to its pre-crisis level in real effective terms.
It is also much weaker than it was in 2001, when
Iceland had its previous currency crisis (see the
top-left panel of Figure 1).
By contrast, in Ireland and Latvia the nominal
effective exchange rate has hardly changed and
real depreciation had different drivers. 
In Ireland the main reason was productivity
improvement (by 12 percent from 2008Q2 to
2011Q3), which is almost equal the real
depreciation (13 percent). During the last three
years, hourly wages changed little, though there
was a modest 4 percent wage decline from the
peak in wages in 2009Q2 to the trough in 2011Q1
(see the second panel in the fourth row of Figure
1)4. The 13 percent real depreciation has restored
Table 4: Decomposition of the change in the unit labour cost based real effective exchange rate index
(from peak* to 2011Q3)
Iceland
(2007Q4 = 100)
Ireland (2008Q2
= 100)
Latvia (2008Q2
= 100)
(1)=(2)*(4)/(3) REER ULC 69 87 81
(2) NEER 55 98 99
(3) Trading partners' ULC 97 101 105
(4)=(5)/(9) ULC 120 89 86
(5)=(6)*(7)*(8) Total labour cost 111 82 73
(6) Employment 94 86 84
(7) Hours worked per employee 95 96 96
(8) Hourly wages 124 100 90
(9) GDP (real) 93 92 85
Memorandum items
(10)=(9)/((6)*(7)) Productivity 103 112 106
(11) Consumer prices 136 98 108
(12)=(8)/(11) Real wages 91 102 84
(13) Trading partners' consumer prices 110 106 107
(14)=(2)*(11)/(13) REER CPI 68 91 100
Source: Bruegel based on data detailed in the note to Figure 1. Notes: * The peak in Icelandic ULC-based REER was in 2007Q2
(see Figure 1), but it hardly changed until 2007Q4 and most adjustment occurred after 2007Q4. Therefore, the table tracks
the adjustments since then. In order to get rid of very short-term noise in the data, the entries shown in the table were calcu-
lated on the basis of Hodrick-Prescott filtered series with smoothing parameter 1, a very low parameter. Note that the stan-
dard smoothing parameter for quarterly data is 1600. Figure 1 shows both the original and this Hodrick-Prescott filtered
series, which suggests that the filter well captures the main tendencies and also the turning points.
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Figure 1: Real eﬀective exchange rate indices and their main components, 2000Q1-2011Q3
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat and the central statistical offices of the three countries. Note: For Ireland and Latvia we
use the Eurostat indicator for real and nominal effective exchange rate, which is calculated against 36 trading partners. REER-ULC
from Eurostat is available up to 2010Q4. Values for 2011Q1-Q3 are Bruegel estimates. For Iceland we use the real effective exchange
rate published by the Central Bank of Iceland but the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is not available from official sources.
Therefore, we used the NEER calculated by Darvas (2011), which may not be consistent with the REER of the Central Bank of Ice-
land. However, the bias from this inconsistency could be quite small, since trading partners’ ULC – line (3) of Table 4 – looks rea-
sonable and it was derived from the REER, NEER and domestic ULC. For each variable two lines are shown: the seasonally adjusted
data (we used Census X12 for seasonal adjustment) is indicated with a thin line, and the Hodrick-Prescott filtered values are
shown with the same colour thick line. For Hodrick-Prescott filtering we used the smoothing parameter 1, a very low parameter, to
filter out high frequency noise only. Note that the standard smoothing parameter for quarterly data is 1600. The comparison of the
original and this Hodrick-Prescott filtered series suggests that the filter captures well the main tendencies and the turning points.
the real effective exchange rate level of late 2004.
However, it should be also highlighted that the
Irish tradable sector was competitive even before
the crisis and ULC increases characterised mostly
the non-tradable sector (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and
Sapir, 2011; Darvas, Gouardo, Pisani-Ferry and
Sapir, 2011). For example, manufacturing ULC was
Zsolt Darvas  A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES
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5. It should be noted that
we use the REER published
by Eurostat, which is
calculated against 36
trading partners, not
including Russia. Russia’s
share in Latvia’s export was
13 percent in 2007
(Russia’s share is much
lower for Iceland, 1.4
percent, and Ireland, 0.4
percent). According to
calculations by the Bank of
Latvia, the REER that
includes Russia as well
among trading partners
depreciated somewhat
more than the Eurostat
indicator.
6. For example, according
the aggregate balance
sheet of the credit system
published by the Central
Bank of Iceland, gross for-
eign borrowing exceeded
lending to the domestic
non-financial sectors in
2006 and 2007.
7. The first ruling of the
Supreme Court in June
2010 applied to motor vehi-
cle loans to households,
which were later extended
by the Icelandic Parliament
to mortgage loans for resi-
dents (December 2010),
and by the Supreme Court
to corporate loans (June
2011). These loans were
converted into domestic
currency loans, whereby
the outstanding principles
of the loans were reduced
considerably, and the inter-
est rates were also recalcu-
lated (retroactively as well)
using the lowest non-
indexed interest rate pub-
lished by the Central Bank
of Iceland.
on a continuous downward trend (similarly to
Germany) in the decade prior to the crisis and has
declined even further during the crisis.
In Latvia, the main driver of adjustment was a fall
in nominal hourly wages (10 percent). The real
exchange rate adjustment was helped by an
increase in foreign ULC (5 percent) and a
moderate productivity improvement (6 percent).
As a result, the Latvian ULC-based REER is 19
percent lower in 2011Q3 compared to its peak in
2008Q2, but this adjustment has only restored
the early 2007 value of this index and is still 30
percent higher than in 2000Q15.
However, the public and private sector distinction
is crucial for Latvia. Table 5 shows, using annual
data, that from 2008 to 2010 hourly labour costs
declined by 7 percent for the whole economy. But
this decline primarily came from the public sector:
the decline was 26 percent in public
administration, 22 percent in education and 16
percent in health and social work. In contrast,
hourly labour costs have declined by only two
percent in manufacturing and the decline (if any)
in various private sector activities was also minor.
Furthermore, the recent minor declines in hourly
labour costs in private sector activities have not
even compensated for one year of increase before:
the change in hourly labour costs from 2007 to
2010 (second data column in Table 5) is in the
range of 10-20 percent for most private sector
activities. Therefore, while the public sector in
Latvia was able to significantly reduce nominal
wages, the internal devaluation, ie nominal wage
and price falls, hardly worked in the private sector.
However, due to a greater fall in labour input than
output (Tables 7 and 8), productivity has
improved in both industry and manufacturing.
According to calculations by the Bank of Latvia,
the manufacturing ULC-based REER in 2011Q2
was 2 percent below the level of 2000Q1, yet
above the level of 2002. 
2.2 Bank rescue and bank losses
The second main difference between the countries
is their capacity to rescue banks and the
consequent distribution of bank losses. 
In Iceland, where credit to the private sector
reached 3.5 times Icelandic GDP (Table 1), the
combined balance sheet of banks reached an
even greater number, and banks heavily borrowed
from the wholesale market6, the government did
not have the means to save the banks (Buiter and
Sibert, 2008; Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and
Zoega, 2011). Therefore, there was no choice but
to let the banks default when global money
markets froze after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. Banks also suffered
heavily from their domestic lending. In addition to
the recession and the collapse in housing prices,
the depreciating currency and the consequent
accelerating inflation also led to deteriorating
bank balance sheets. In mid-2008 more than 70
percent of total corporate loans were denominated
in foreign currencies and most lending to
households was indexed to the consumer price
index. Borrowers, therefore, found it more difficult
to service their debts. In addition, the Icelandic
Supreme Court declared illegal foreign-exchange-
indexed loans (ie loans paid out and collected in
Icelandic krónur, but indexed to foreign
currencies), thereby increasing the burden on
banks7.
Domestic deposits in Iceland (by both residentsSource: Central Statistical Office of Latvia.
Table 5: Latvia: percent change in hourly labour
costs by kind of activity
Change
2008-10
Change
2007-10
TOTAL -7 14
Agric., forestry, fishing (A) 1 20
Mining and quarrying (B) -1 22
Manufacturing (C) -2 19
Electricity, gas, steam (D) 1 5
Construction (F) -5 14
Wholesale and retail trade; repair
of motor vehicles/motorcycles (G)
-6 17
Accom. and food service (I) -3 22
Information and comm. (J) -2 25
Finance and insurance (K) -7 11
Real estate activities (L) -3 16
Professional/scientific/tech. (M) 3 25
Public administration and defence;
compulsory social security (O)
-26 -14
Education (P) -22 -2
Health and social work (Q) -16 1
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8. According to the table on
page 13 of IMF (2011b),
bank restructuring debt
amounts to 16.2 percent-
age point out of the 92.6
percent of GDP public debt
of Iceland in 2010. Accord-
ing to Benediktsdottir,
Danielsson and Zoega
(2011) 12 percent of GDP
was used to recapitalise
banks and 11 percent of
GDP to recapitalise the cen-
tral bank. These numbers
do not include the contin-
gent impact of compensat-
ing the British and Dutch
depositors of Icesave, but
Danielsson and Zoega
(2011) argue that the
actual cost may not be
more than 2 percent of GDP,
since most of the costs will
be covered by the recovery
from the assets of Lansd-
banki, the bank that oper-
ated Icesave.
9. These numbers do not
include the operations of
the National Asset manage-
ment Agency (NAMA).
10. O’Rourke (2011) and
Brennan (2010) argue that
the IMF advocated that the
Irish government not pay
back all of unguaranteed
senior debt owned by Irish
banks, but the EU and the
ECB insisted upon the oppo-
site. See Lane (2011a) for
arguments for and against
the restructuring of senior
bank debt.
11. See Buiter, Michels and
Rahbari (2011).
and non-residents) were fully guaranteed, but the
issue of the depositors of Icesave, which operated
as a branch of Landsbanki (one of the three
formermajor Icelandic banks) in the UK and the
Netherlands, is still unsettled. Foreign creditors of
Icelandic banks faced a €47 billion loss (source:
Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011,
citing the Financial Services Authority of Iceland
report). This loss is 3.1 times greater than 2007
Icelandic GDP and 5.4 times 2009 Icelandic GDP.
The Central Bank of Iceland also suffered losses,
since it provided massive liquidity support to
banks, which, by mid-2008, reached about one-
third of GDP (source: liquidity support is from
Figure 3 of Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega,
2011; GDP is from Eurostat). Consequently, the
Central Bank of Iceland needed significant
recapitalisation from the government. Bank-
related losses increased the public debt ratio by
about 20 percentage points of GDP8. Parallel to the
collapse of banks, the banking system was
restructured to manage domestic credit and to
keep the payments system functioning (Box 1). 
In Ireland, the balance sheet of Irish-owned banks
was 3.7 times GDP in 2007, yet with international
financial centres the ratio was 7.1 times GDP
(Table 1). The Irish government guaranteed most
liabilities of Irish-owned banks. In September
2008, the total liabilities of the credit institutions
resident in Ireland were €1,446 billion, of which
€787 billion was the liability of domestic banks
(source: Central Bank of Ireland). According to
Davy Research (2009), the liability of Irish-owned
banks was €575 billion, of which the guarantee
covered € 440 billion. Taxpayers’ money was used
to cover bank losses above bank capital (which
was wiped out) and subordinated bank
bondholders (whose loss is estimated to be about
10 percent of Irish GDP in the form of retiring €25
billion subordinated debt for new debt or equity of
€10 billion). According to FitzGerald and Kearney
(2011), of the €148 billion of gross public debt at
end-2010, €46.3 billion (30 percent of GDP) was
due to government intervention in the banking
system, which increased to €60 billion (about 40
percent of GDP) by mid-20119. The initial decision
for not restructuring banks' senior debt was made
entirely by the Irish authorities. But later, when the
problems with the blanket guarantee became
clearer and the issue emerged in political debates,
the pressure from European institutions, most
prominently the European Central Bank, but also
from governments including countries outside the
euro area (UK, US), prohibited a changed in the
policy. The European Central Bank feared
disruption of bank-funding markets throughout
the euro area10. 
At the same time, the Eurosystem (lending from
the European Central Bank and from the Central
Bank of Ireland via the Exceptional Liquidity
Assistance11), provided ample liquidity. This
support is given at a very low interest rate of about
one percent per year – well below the previous
funding cost of banks, thereby amounting to
significant support for Irish banks. The amount of
Eurosystem lending has fluctuated between €78
billion and €138 billion since October 2008, the
June 2011 figure amounting to €100 billion.
BOX 1: BANK RESTRUCTURING IN ICELAND
In a matter of few weeks after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, whole-
sale funding disappeared and the three major
Icelandic banks, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Lands-
banki, could not continue their operations.
They were put into receivership and their
boards replaced by resolution committees.
Each of the failed banks was divided into two:
a new and an old bank. New state-owned
banks were established, and these banks took
over the domestic activities of the three old
banks, while international businesses
remained with the failed old banks for winding
up. The division itself was a complicated affair,
involving protracted negotiations over the ‘fair
value’ of the defaulted banks' assets as they
were transferred to the new, post-crisis banks.
In the end, creditors of the old banks placed
capital in the new banks, thus ensuring their
stake in any potential upside from an eco-
nomic recovery. All three new banks have been
recapitalised with strong capital ratios – in
excess of 16 percent of all assets – and are 90
percent funded with deposits. Most of smaller
savings banks were also restructured. During
the whole process, all deposits in Iceland (both
of residents and non-residents) were guaran-
teed in full.
Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
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Therefore, this massive low-interest rate lending
was (and still is) a significant support to Irish
banks.
In Latvia about two thirds of the banking system
was owned by foreign banks (mostly
Scandinavian banks), which assumed banking
losses and supported their Latvian subsidiaries,
thereby making the lender-of-last-resort role of the
Latvian central bank less relevant. The Swedish
central bank offered a euro/lats swap to Latvia
and the ECB agreed with the Swedish central bank
a Swedish krona/euro swap. Thereby ECB support
could have been channelled indirectly to Latvia.
The major domestically-owned Parex Bank was
nationalised. According to the ECB’s data on
consolidated banking statistics, the loss incurred
by foreign banks was about 5.7 percent of GDP
and the loss of domestic banks about 3.6 percent
of GDP by 2010 – a large amount, but well below
the banking sector losses in the two other case-
study countries. IMF (2011c, Table 4, page 35)
calculated that bank support boosted the public
debt/GDP ratio by about 7 percentage points of
GDP by 2010.
2.3 Capital controls
The third major difference was the introduction of
capital controls in Iceland but not in the other two
countries. Due to fear of further capital outflows
and additional depreciation of the Icelandic krona,
in late 2008 strict capital controls were introduced
in Iceland. This has locked in non-resident
deposits and government paper holdings in
Iceland and locked out Icelandic krona assets held
outside the country, in addition to prohibiting
transfers across the border by both residents and
non-residents. IMF (2011b, page 14) estimates
offshore krona holdings at 30 percent of GDP and
reports a high spread between onshore and
offshore exchange rates, indicating that the
capital controls are effective (Figure 6 of IMF
2011b, page 15).
Viterbo (2011) assessed the legality of Iceland’s
capital controls in light of international
agreements. While under the IMF Articles,
countries retain the right to impose capital
controls, the EEA (European Economic Area)
Agreement guarantees the free movement of
payments and capital among the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) states and European
Union countries. The Icelandic controls were not
deemed illegal under EEA regulations, because
they were triggered by exceptional economic
circumstances. But to remain legal, the
restrictions would have to be lifted once the crisis
was over, but this seems to be a major challenge
(Gylfason, 2011; IMF, 2011b).
2.4 Fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation, ie policy-induced change in
government revenues and expenditures, was
central to the adjustment programme in all three
countries. As Table 6 shows, Latvia’s adjustment
was the most radical in 2009, while Ireland’s
adjustment was the least ambitious in 2010.
However, cumulatively the adjustment is broadly
similar in the three countries. 
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Table 6: Annual fiscal adjustment (% GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Iceland 5.1 6.4 2.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Expenditure reductions 3.2 3.6 1.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Revenue enhancement 1.9 2.8 0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 5 2.6 3.7 2.2 1.8 1.6
Expenditure reductions n.a. n.a. 2.8 1.3 1.2 1
Revenue enhancement n.a. n.a. 1 0.9 0.6 0.6
Latvia 9.4 3.3 2.2 0.9 n.a. n.a.
Expenditure reductions 8.2 1.9 0.6 0.4 n.a. n.a.
Revenue enhancement 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.5 n.a. n.a.
Source: Bruegel based on: Ireland – Table 2 on page 135 of OECD (2011a), Iceland – Table 2.3 on page 73 of OECD (2011b),
Latvia – IMF Latvia Team Calculations.
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3 DIFFERENT ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
Economic outcomes in the three countries were
shaped by their pre-crisis vulnerabilities. All three
went through massive credit booms (the
speediest in Iceland) and an increasing share of
construction in output (reaching the highest level
in Iceland). Both Latvia and Iceland had unusually
large current account deficits – over 20 percent of
GDP (Figure 2). Ireland’s deficit was more
moderate – about 5 percent of GDP. As a
consequence, the net international investment
positions of Iceland and Latvia deteriorated
significantly before the crisis, while in Ireland the
deterioration was modest (Table 2). Since private
capital inflows stopped abruptly in Iceland and
Latvia after September 2008, the current account
balance had to improve accordingly. The required
Zsolt Darvas  A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES
Figure 2: Current account (% GDP), 1990-2012
Source: European Commission (2011b). Note: the shaded
2011-2012 values are forecasts.
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10
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES Zsolt Darvas
improvements in external accounts had knock-on
effects on all components of demand,
employment and public finance. 
• In all three countries economic hardship
started several quarters before the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008;
therefore, we normalise quarterly GDP figures
as 2007 Q4 = 100 in Figure 3. From peak to
trough, Latvian GDP collapsed by 25 percent,
which is about twice as much as in Iceland and
Ireland, even though in all three countries
output fell back to its early 2005 level. Among
the 184 countries included in IMF (2011d),
Latvia suffered from the greatest fall in output
in 2009 (18 percent), and also during the three
years from 2007 to 2010 (22 percent). Ireland
(fifth place) and Iceland (seventh place) are
also among the worst performers in the ranking
of cumulative output loss from 2007 to 2010,
with drops in output of ten and nine percent,
respectively.
• In Iceland the massive current account
adjustment was to a great extent fostered by
export growth. Among the 34 countries for
which Eurostat publishes constant price data
on exports of goods and services, Iceland was
the only country where there was a growth in
2009 compared to 2008 (Figure 4). It is not
clear cut if the large exchange rate depreciation
had a positive impact on exports in Iceland,
because about one-half of exports are
concentrated in aluminium and marine
products, and the growth of aluminium exports
was likely the result of the new capacities built
in the years before the crisis (see Appendix).
However, the exports of services (comprising
35 percent of total Icelandic exports of goods
and services) picked-up in 2009, a year after
the real exchange rate depreciation. These
exports may have been positively affected by
the depreciation. Also, the higher costs of
imports have likely encouraged import
substitution. More generally, the highly
increased revenues from export activities likely
dampened the impact of the crisis.
• Exports also started to recover in Ireland and
Latvia in 2010, a trend forecast to continue by
the European Commission (2011b). However,
Ireland and Latvia are only in the mid-field
compared to the performance of other
countries (Panel A of Figure 4). But export
volumes also depend on foreign demand, which
contracted by about 8 percent more for Latvia
than for the other two countries12. To correct for
different developments in import markets,
12. This is largely due to the
higher share of Estonia,
Lithuania, Russia and
Ukraine (four countries that
witnessed massive import
contraction) in Latvian
exports.
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Figure 4: Exports of goods and services in 34 countries (at constant prices, 2007=100), 2007-12
Source: Bruegel using data from European Commission (2011b), OECD, and national sources (for China, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Thailand, Ukraine). Note: The shaded 2011-2012 values are forecasts. Panel A shows the development of exports of
goods and services in 34 countries for which the Eurostat publishes these data: the 27 EU countries plus Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland, Croatia, Turkey, United States and Japan. Panel B shows the ratio of export volume to foreign import volume. For-
eign import volume is the weighted average (using country-specific weights derived from 2007 export data) of imports of
goods and services of 47 countries, comprising the 34 countries listed plus Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Israel,
Korea, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic), Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Ukraine. On average, these 47 coun-
tries comprise 89 percent of exports, while for Iceland, Ireland and Latvia the coverage is 94-95 percent.
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Panel B of Figure 4 shows the ratio of export
volumes of the country under consideration to
import volumes of trading partners. The
performances of Ireland and Latvia are almost
identical in this regard and they are in the mid-
field, while Iceland is still among the best
performers, though its advantage is declining.
• There was a similar collapse in investment in
all three countries, and so far investment has
started to recover only in Latvia.
• Private consumption went into free fall in both
Iceland and Latvia. The adjustment in Ireland
was smaller, but is ongoing, while in Iceland
and Latvia private consumption growth has
resumed.
• Public consumption adjusted the most in Latvia
(a 20 percent drop); less so in Ireland and, in
particular, in Iceland. This partly reflects the
different speeds of fiscal consolidation in the
three countries (Table 6).
• Imports declined by about 40 percent in Iceland
and Latvia, in line with the falls in investment and
private consumption, while the Irish import decline
(14 percent) was similar to the EU average.
These developments in output and demand
translated into very different social impacts.
• Iceland experienced a modest (5 percent) drop
in employment from 2007 to 2010 (Table 7),
while job losses were much more dramatic in
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Figure 5: At risk of poverty (% population), 2005-10
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (all data but the 2010 data
for Ireland, which was chained to Eurostat data using data
from the Irish Central Statistics Office). Note: The rate
assesses whether disposable net income (both from employ-
ment, investment and social transfers) falls below the
poverty threshold. The threshold is set at 60 percent of the
national median income per equivalent adult.
Latvia (17 percent) and Ireland (13 percent).
The number of jobs in Latvia fell below the level
of early 2000 – though there has been a slight
recovery in employment since early 2010 (see
the third panel in the third row of Figure 1).
• Poverty was already high in Latvia and has
increased, while Iceland was not impacted in
this regard, and in Ireland a gradual
improvement up to 2009 reversed somewhat
in 2010 (Figure 5).
The different employment impacts are not the
consequence of shortened working time – in all
three countries the average hours worked per
week declined by 4-5 percent (Table 4 and Figure
1). Also, the difference is not the consequence of
emigration, since Iceland experienced the largest
net emigration (as a percent of population) in
2008 and 2009 (Figure 6), even though official
data on migration may not be reliable. But in any
case, emigration cannot explain the very high
level of unemployment that was seen in Ireland
and Latvia.
The differences in employment response could be
related to policies, the sectoral composition of
production, and the shift in sectoral composition. 
Table 7 shows that the major differences are:
• Industrial employment, which remained
broadly stable in Iceland, but which fell by
almost 20 percent in the other two countries;
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
-2.0%
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
Ireland
Iceland
Latvia
Figure 6: Net immigration (% of population),
2000-10
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three countries. Note that migration data could be unreliable. 
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Table 7: Change in employment from 2007 to 2010 (number of people and percent share in total employment) 
2007 to 2010 % change Share in total employment (%)
Iceland Ireland Latvia Iceland Ireland Latvia
2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
Agriculture and fishing -8 -23 -21 5.9 5.8 5.5 4.9 9.7 9.2
Construction -33 -54 -50 8.0 6.3 13.4 7.1 11.3 6.7
Finance and real estate -3 -5 -3 14.9 15.2 13.6 14.9 9.8 11.5
Industry -1 -19 -18 11.7 12.2 13.0 12.0 16.5 16.3
Public Administration 2 5 -11 34.3 36.9 27.0 32.5 23.3 24.7
Trade, Tourism, Transport -8 -9 -10 24.3 23.5 26.5 27.6 29.3 31.6
Total -5 -13 -17 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: European Commission (2011b). Note: the peak of Icelandic construction employment was in 2008, which was fol-
lowed by a 40 percent fall by 2010.
Table 8: Shifts among the branches of economic activity from 2007 to 2010
Gross value added Share in output (percent)
(% change in real output
from 2007 to 2010)
Iceland Ireland Latvia
Iceland Ireland Latvia 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing -4 2 9 5.3 6.6 1.4 1.0 3.5 4.5
Fishing and aquaculture -6 4.2 5.5
Other 9 1.0 1.1
B&C&D&E. Industry 18 13 -8 14.2 19.1 23.7 25.9 15.0 18.7
C. Manufacturing 19 -12 9.9 13.8 21.6 23.8 11.7 13.4
Manufacture of basic metals 123 1.7 2.8
Other manufacturing 0 8.2 11.0
B&D&E. Other industry 14 8 4.3 5.3 2.1 2.1 3.3 5.3
F. Construction -59 -58 -50 11.4 4.1 9.6 5.5 10.4 5.9
G&H&I&J. Trade; repair; transport; tourism -7 -12 -18 21.9 20.7 33.0 34.3
K. Financial and insurance activities -40
-12
-16 6.6 7.8 5.4 3.7
L. Real estate activities -13 2 11.0 11.0 8.2 8.3
M&N&R&S. Other services -14 -26 9.2 9.9 9.3 9.8
O-Q. Public admin.; social sec.; educ.; health -1 -4 -15 20.3 20.7 15.2 14.8
All sectors (gross value added) -11 -8 -17 100 100 100 100 100 100
All sectors (GDP) -9 -10 -21
Source: Bruegel based on central statistical office of the three countries. Note: empty cells indicate non-available data. For Ire-
land, data for the branches K and L are not available separately, but only their aggregate. The peak of Irish construction output
as a share of total output was 10.6 percent in 2006.
Therefore, employment in industry, which is the
most tradable sector, was protected in Iceland, but
almost every fifth job was lost in Ireland and
Latvia.
Looking at the shifts in economic activity (Table
8), the share of industry in total output has
increased in all three countries, but while in
Iceland and Ireland real industrial output has also
increased, in Latvia real industrial output fell,
though by a lesser magnitude (by 8 percent) than
total output (17 percent). 
• Public employment, which fell by 10 percent in
Latvia, but has even slightly increased in the
other two countries;
• Construction employment, which fell by 33
percent in Iceland and about 50 percent in the
other two countries – yet the share of
construction employment in total employment
was the smallest in Iceland in 2007 and was
still the smallest in 2010;
• Agriculture and fishing employment, which fell
less in Iceland (though the share of this sector
in total employment is small).
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Comparison of Tables 7 and 8 allows productivity
developments to be inferred. Of particular
importance, industrial productivity has increased
in all three countries – most rapidly in Ireland by
39 percent, followed by Iceland (19 percent) and
Latvia (12 percent).
The differences between Iceland and Latvia in
terms of output and employment are likely
explained by real exchange rate developments,
since both countries had to adjust massively their
net external financing. The prompt and significant
nominal and real exchange rate adjustment
increased the revenue of exporting companies
(even if the debt servicing burden went up for
those with foreign currency loans), while in Latvia
the ULC-based real exchange rate depreciation
was delayed, gradual and smaller in magnitude. It
also seems reasonable to assume that the Irish
output fall was less dramatic than in Latvia
because of the smaller external adjustment need. 
However, what is less clear is why Irish employ-
ment contracted much more than in Iceland given
the broadly similar GDP developments and the fall
in the share of construction in GDP. Construction
employment fell more in Ireland than in Iceland,
but this is just one element and not the most
important part of the difference, since Irish indus-
trial employment was also dropped massively.
Perhaps the major real exchange rate adjustment
helped the Icelandic economy to shift from the
non-tradable to the tradable sector faster, improv-
ing growth prospects, and this mitigated the
employment impact, despite the broadly similar
output development to date. 
But it is also possible that corporate restructuring
was delayed in Iceland. Several companies
became insolvent due to sharp currency
depreciation, because – as we have said earlier –
most corporate loans were indexed to foreign
currencies. But most of these companies were not
closed down but passed into bank ownership –
banks have become holding companies of a sort.
Banks may have delayed the proper restructuring
of these companies so far. Unfortunately we have
no information about the speed of corporate
restructuring in Ireland, but if this has been much
slower in Iceland, it could explain some of the
differences in employment developments.
What about public finances?
• Before the crisis, gross government debt was
below 30 percent of GDP in all three countries,
but started to balloon quickly (Figure 7). In
addition to the fall in output and the large
budget deficits, support to the banking sector
has also contributed to the increase in public
debt13. As said in section 2.2, bank support
boosted Irish public debt by about 40 percent
of GDP, Icelandic public debt by about 20
percent and Latvian public debt by about 7
percent. Since Iceland and Latvia gained better
control over the budget deficit than Ireland –
partly due to the difference in bank support –
European Commission (2011b) forecasts
stabilisation of the debt ratio in the two
countries, but in Ireland a further 20
percentage points of GDP increase is expected
till 2012 (Figure 7).
• The credit default swap (CDS) spread on the
sovereign rose above 1000 basis points in
Latvia and Iceland in late 2008 and early 2009,
while staying at a level of about 250 basis
points in Ireland  (Figure 8). This situation has
reversed since then, but Irish CDS spreads have
also declined substantially since summer
2011 – despite the on-going euro-area
sovereign debt and banking crisis.
• On 9 June 2011, for the first time since the
crisis, the Icelandic and Latvian governments
successfully issued bonds on the international
bond markets (see details in Reuters, 2011).
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13. Bank support is part of
the reported budget deficit,
yet it is important to
highlight its impact
separately.
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This is especially remarkable for Iceland, a
country that still maintains strict capital
controls and let its banks default on their
foreign liabilities. Also, both Iceland and Latvia
could borrow in domestic currency from the
start of the official assistance programme in
late 2008 (IMF 2011b and 2011c). In contrast,
the Irish government has stopped borrowing
from markets since the start of its assistance
programme in late November 2010 (IMF
2011a), though small-scale retail and
commercial paper selling has continued.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Iceland, Ireland and Latvia experienced similar
developments before the crisis, in particular rapid
increases in banks’ balance sheets and the
expansion of the construction sector. But the the
crisis hit the countries differently:
• Latvia was the world's hardest-hit country in
terms of GDP decline. Employment also
suffered massively (-17 percent) – more than
in any other country for which Eurostat
publishes data; the current level of employment
is just slightly above the level in 2000. The
already high level of poverty has increased
further.
• Ireland was the world's fifth hardest hit country
in terms of GDP decline from 2007 to 2010 (10
percent) and employment has also fallen
significantly (-13 percent). 
• Iceland, the world's seventh hardest hit country
in terms of GDP decline (-9 percent), came out
from the crisis with the smallest drop in
employment (-5 percent) among the three
countries, despite the greatest shock to its
financial system. 
In exiting the crisis, there are several encouraging
signals for all three countries:
• First, recovery has started in all three countries
– with the fastest pace in Latvia – though it has
not yet brought many new jobs.
• Exports are growing in all three countries, with
again the fastest pace in Latvia, where exports
suffered the most during the first phase of the
crisis.
• The total-economy ULC-based real effective
exchange rate has depreciated significantly in
all three countries.
• The various fiscal, structural and banking
sector targets of the official financing
programmes are on track in all three countries.
• It was a great success that both Iceland and
Latvia could tap the international bond market
in June 2011 and five-year CDS spreads on
government bonds have declined to about 200-
300 basis points in both countries. 
• It is also a success that Irish CDS spreads have
declined from the peak of over 1000 basis point
in June 2011 to about 600-700 basis points in
November 2011, despite the intensifying euro-
area sovereign debt and banking crisis during
the same period. Also, sizeable injection of
private capital into the Bank of Ireland signals
A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES Zsolt Darvas
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increasing confidence in the country
(European Commission, 2011a).
Even though there were common elements in the
policy mix, such as fiscal austerity, structural
reforms, private-debt restructuring and banking-
system support, the diverse crisis responses are
partly the consequence of differences in policy
responses. The main country-specific elements
were:
• In Iceland there was no choice but to let banks
default and the currency depreciate. In
addition, strict capital controls were introduced
to limit capital outflows and dampen the
collapse of the exchange rate. Delay in
corporate restructuring may have also damped
the employment impact. 
• In Ireland banks were not allowed to default,
but the government assumed most of the bank
losses – beyond wiping out bank capital and
the involvement of subordinated bank
bondholders, which suffered losses of about 10
percent of GDP.
• In Latvia the exchange rate peg to the euro was
kept. Since about 60 percent of bank assets
belonged to subsidiaries of foreign banks, a
significant share of bank losses was assumed
by the parent banks. Fiscal austerity was the
most radical in Latvia.
Isolating the impact of each element of the policy
mix on the response to the crisis and the speed of
recovery is not possible. Yet several lessons can
be drawn:
• The Icelandic example in the aftermath of the
collapse of the exchange rate shows that the
fears among Latvian policymakers of a similar
collapse were not well justified. Iceland had
much higher gross and also net foreign
liabilities than Latvia and the shock in Iceland
was really enormous – much higher than what
Latvia would have suffered with exchange-rate
devaluation. The banking sector suffered
meltdown in Iceland and foreign lenders to
banks suffered massive losses. Yet the crisis
impact was much more benign in Iceland than
Latvia14.Internal devaluation, a path that
Ireland had to choose and Latvia decided to
choose, has not really worked through wage
reductions. Public sector wages were cut
drastically in Latvia (26 percent fall), which is
less relevant for competitiveness, but private
sector wages have hardly fallen. In Ireland
nominal wages fell somewhat, but their
contribution to the drop in unit labour costs
was also very small. At the same time
unemployment skyrocketed in both countries,
which was not just related to layoffs of public
sector and construction workers. It would have
been much better to adjust through lower
wages than through lay-offs. 
• Productivity improvements, which were
impressive in Ireland (12 percent increase
during the past three years) and moderate in
Latvia (6 percent increase), accompanied the
strategy of internal devaluation. However, in
both countries productivity improved because
of a significant drop in output and an even
more significant drop in employment. While
any productivity improvement helps the
survival of the corporate sector, the social
impact of unemployment is very alarming.
• Total economy productivity increased
marginally (by 3 percent) in Iceland, but the
tradable sector has strengthened and industrial
productivity improved very fast – faster than in
Latvia but less rapidly than in Ireland.
• The negative impacts of capital controls in the
cases of Iceland are not really visible. While
Arnason and Danielson (2011) rightly argue
that capital controls have negative
consequences, such as transfer of new powers
to the government enabling it to implement
industrial policy (by deciding who can change
Icelandic krona to foreign currencies),
signalling wrong prices (since the on-shore
exchange rate is not a market rate), and
significantly limiting currency exchange for
ordinary citizens, Iceland is doing well and the
fall in its CDS spread and the success of its
international bond issues suggests that trust
has returned. Yet, a major challenge lies ahead
to lift capital controls (Gylfason, 2011; IMF,
2011b).
• The experience with the collapse of the gigantic
Icelandic banking system suggests that letting
banks fail when they had a faulty business
model can be the right choice. While socialis-
ing bank losses in Ireland was initially an Irish
decision, later, when the Irish government
Zsolt Darvas  A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES
14. See Darvas (2009) for
an assessment of various
arguments in favour and
against devaluation, in
which paper I suggested a
speedy euro entry
(enhanced by changes in
the EU Treaty or at least by
a proper interpretation of
current Treaty provisions for
euro-area entry) at a deval-
ued exchange rate, sup-
ported by appropriate
resolution to manage the
debt overhang. The Ice-
landic experience suggests
that Latvia would have
likely been better off with
devaluation even without
the option of a speedy entry
into the euro area. There-
fore, in this important
respect I disagree with the
conclusion of Åslund and
Dombrovskis (2011), even
though I agree that other
elements of the adjustment
programme were well
designed, and its imple-
mentation was a heroic
achievement.
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wanted to change course, European institu-
tions barred it primarily in the name of finan-
cial stability in the euro area and beyond. At the
same time, politicians in countries where
banks are heavily exposed to Ireland were
afraid of bank losses and their implications for
their own countries – and thereby argued
against involving the creditors of Irish banks.
Little is known about what would have hap-
pened to financial stability outside Ireland in
the event of letting Irish banks default, but one
thing is clear: other countries have benefited
from the Irish socialisation of a large share of
bank losses, which has significantly con-
tributed to the explosion of Irish public debt. The
very high level of interconnectedness of Euro-
pean banks and potential cross-country
spillovers of national bank resolution practices
strongly call for an EU-wide bank resolution
regime (Posen and Véron, 2009; and Véron,
2011). Yet EU-wide resolution could work if reg-
ulation and supervision are also centralised,
and an EU-wide deposit guarantee would also
make the financial system more resilient. There
is a strong case for a ‘banking federation’.
• The fulfilment of programme targets in terms of
fiscal adjustment and structural reforms
suggests that, whenever the programme is well
designed and there is political will, public
support and sufficiently effective institutions,
very large adjustments are possible. If the
adjustment experiences of the three countries
could be a lesson for other countries, such as
the Mediterranean countries of the euro area,
should be the subject of a different study.
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APPENDIX: THE COMPOSITION OF ICELAND’S EXPORTS
Iceland’s exports are highly concentrated in two major industries: aluminium and marine/other fish
products. In 2010 export goods belonging to these two major product categories comprised 52 per-
cent of Iceland’s total exports of goods and services (Panel A of Figure 9). The share of services was 35
percent (of which about one-half is related to transportation and one-quarter to tourism), the share of
non-aluminium manufacturing goods was 10 percent and the share of all other goods was 3 percent. 
Unfortunately, volume index is not available for product categories, but only for the aggregate of goods
and services. Figure 10 shows that export volumes increased rapidly around the time of the significant
depreciation (which started in late 2007 and accelerated in early 2008). While the speedy increase in
the volume of services that started in 2009 is likely related to the depreciation, such an impact is not
clear-cut for the export of goods. Unfortunately, the volume index is not available for export good cate-
gories only, but their weight is available (Panel B of Figure 9). Weight is a rather imprecise measure of
volume when the composition is changing15. But keeping in mind this imprecision, Panel B of Figure 9
suggests that there was a strong expansion of aluminium exports in 2007 and especially in 2008.
Most likely the main reason behind this was not the free-fall of the exchange rate, but the new capaci-
ties that were built in the years before. However, the weight of other goods exported was broadly stable
at a time when global trade declined significantly, a development in which the exchange rate may have
had a role. And the revenue from all export activities has increased significantly since the fall in the
exchange rate, thereby helping the survival of the sectors producing for exports.
15. This is apparent from
the comparison of the cur-
rent price and weight devel-
opments of the exports of
other goods after 2007. A
seeming anomaly is the fall
of current price exports
(Panel A of figure 8) when
the weight is broadly stable
(Panel B). Export of aircraft
(along with some other
product categories) is
responsible for this seem-
ing anomaly. In 2009 air-
craft accounted for 55
percent of the value of
exports of other goods, but
only 0.5 percent of their
weight. By 2010, the weight
of exported aircraft declined
by 25 percent (causing
negligible impact on the
total weight of exported
other goods), but it has
reduced by 38 percent the
Iceland krona value of
exports.
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Figure 9: Composition of Icelandic exports, 2000-10
Source for both figures: Statistics Iceland.
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